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MumcrPAL CoRPORATIONs--ANNExA.noN-VIOtATION oF Dus PRoCEssThe City of Silver Grove brought a proceeding to incorporate within its
boundaries a parcel of defendant railroad's land under a general law of annexation.1 It was shown that the land sought to be annexed contained nothing
but switchyards, roundhouses, refrigeration plants and other facilities designed
exclusively for railroad purposes. It was further shown that the city could
make no use of the land nor could it benefit the land in any way since the
railroad had complete electrical, sanitation and police facilities. Defendant
railroad entered a remonstrance to which the city generally demurred. The
trial court sustained the demurrer. On appeal, held, reversed. Annexation
of land by the municipality constitutes a violation of the state due process
clause because in essence it is nothing more than a device to tax the defendant
railroad and thereby benefit the taxpayers of the city at the defendant's expense.
Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. City of Silver Grove, (Ct. App. Ky. 1952)
249 s.w. (2d) 520.
As a general rule, the legislature has complete control over the political
subdivisions of the state,2 especially in relation to the acquisition or detach-

1

2

Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §§81.040 to 81.060.
2 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONS, 3d ed., §7.26 (1949).
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ment of neighboring parcels of land by the subdivision.3 Although it is
frequently said that this control is limited by provisions in the state or federal 4
constitution, the due process clause is rarely relied upon to prevent abuse by
annexation or detachment. This is clearly shown by the overwhelming number
of decisions indicating that the due process clause will not be invoked even
where the adverse effect upon the territory annexed is staggering. 5 The question of the applicability of the due process clause in this connection has, to a
large extent, been avoided through the operation of general, as opposed to
special, laws of annexation. Under general laws of annexation, which set out
the conditions under which the municipal corporation may act, the courts
have no difficulty in preventing abuse by holding that the particular body has
exceeded its authority in annexing the disputed land. This is done by ruling
that the annexation was unreasonable and hence done without authority since
the courts presume that the legislature would not intend an unreasonable
annexation. 6 However, in the rare situation where the legislature does pass
a special law of annexation, the courts are squarely faced with the choice of
allowing injustice or invoking the constitution when in fact the annexation
is oppressive. The choice is made easier in some states by "uniformity of
taxation" provisions in the constitution.7 Under such a provision the courts
can readily find that the annexation was accomplished with an eye toward
increased tax revenue from the annexed area with no corresponding increase
in benefits to it 8 Without such a provision the courts are usually reduced
to the due process clause. The traditional reluctance to apply the due process
clause in such a situation probably stems from the ancient concept of legislative supremacy over political subdivisions. 0 Thus one court in enunciating
this doctrine said: "It [municipality] has no vested ... powers or franchises.

62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations §43 (1949).
In the leading case, Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 at 178, 28 S.Ct. 40 (1907),
the Court said: "The state, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such
powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other
agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or part of it with another
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. . . . In all these respects the
State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution,
may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States."
Accord: Toney v. Macon, 119 Ga. 83, 46 S.E. 80 (1903), appeal dismissed in 195 U.S.
625, 25 S.Ct. 791 (1904).
5 See 64 A.L.R. 1358 (1930).
6 Red River Valley Brick Co. v. Grand Forks, 27 N.D. 8, 145 N.W. 725 at 727
(1914), and Glaspell v. Jamestown, 11 N.D. 86, 88 N.W. 1023 (1902).
7 See 16 McQurLLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §44.19 (1950), for a compilation of the various constitutional provisions dealing with "uniformity of taxation" and
their effects.
s E.g., Banks v. City of Raleigh, 220 N.C. 35, 16 S.E. (2d) 413 (1941). Reasonableness of annexation is not always determined by reference to the probability of benefit to
the land in question. See Town of Narrows v. Giles County, 184 Va. 628, 35 S.E. (2d)
808 (1945).
9 McQuillin, "Limitations of Legislative Control of Muncipal Corporations," 34 AM.
L. REv. 505 (1900).
3
4
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Its charter or act of right to incorporation is in no sense a contract with the
state. It is subject to the control of the legislature, who may enlarge or
diminish its territorial extent or its functions, and may change or modify its
internal arrangement or destroy its very existence at discretion.''10 The importance of this concept in judicial thinking is clearly demonstrated by the
great disparity in the amount of "injustice" necessary for holding an annexation unreasonable under a general law and the amount sufficient to invoke
the due process clause under a special law. Thus one court when faced with
a special act allowing a clearly unreasonable annexation refused to consider,
much less act upon, the inequities of the plan. 11 Yet many courts, when
investigating an annexation under a general law, have been scrupulous in
examining every single facet of the scheme almost to the point of demanding
complete mutuality of benefi.t. 12 However, the gravity of the question, to a
large extent, has been diminished because of the infrequency of special annexation laws. 13 While the result reached in the instant case seems sound, it was
hardly necessary to invoke the due process clause since the court could have
simply held the annexation unreasonable and hence done without authority
of the general annexation law of Kentucky.
Joseph M. Kortenhof, S.Ed.

Coyle v. Gray, Atty. Gen., 7 Houst. (Del.) 44 at 91, 30 A. 728 (1884).
McGraw v. Merryman, 133 Md. 247, 104 A. 540 (1918).
12 Nolting v. City of Overland, 354 Mo. 960, 192 S.W. (2d) 863 (1946); State v.
City of Reno, 64 Nev. 127, 179 P. (2d) 366 (1947).
13 2 McQmLLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONs, 3d ed., §7.23 (1949).
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